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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the terrorist group, al Qaeda, at-
tacked the United States by flying hijacked, commercial air-
planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania.1 In response to these
attacks, the United States Congress authorized the President to
use the United States military against those organizations and
countries who either played a direct role in the attacks or those
* 2008 J.D. candidate, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; B.S.,
Political Science (major), Justice Systems (minor), 2005, Truman State Univer-
sity. I would like to thank Professor Mary Garvey Algero and the Fall 2006 Ad-
vanced Legal Writing Class, specifically Simone Harvey Yoder and Teressa A.
Valentine for helping edit and critique my casenote. I would also like to thank
Emily D. Richardson for helping me edit this casenote as well.
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
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who aided the commission of the attacks.2 Following this au-
thorization, the President ordered the military forces of the
United States to Afghanistan in order to suppress al Qaeda and
remove the Taliban regime which was known to provide aid to
al Qaeda.3 This marked the start of what has become known as
the War on Terror.4 Over the course of the War on Terror, the
United States military has captured hundreds of al Qaeda and
Taliban combatants involved in the conflict in Afghanistan and
has detained them at the United States Naval Base in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.5
One such prisoner was Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni
national who was captured by military forces in Afghanistan
and sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.6 Hamdan filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and challenged the military tribunal
that was hearing his case. 7 The Supreme Court held, in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that the prisoners being held at Guanta-
namo Bay, both al Qaeda and Taliban, were entitled to protec-
tions under the Geneva Convention.8
The way in which war is fought has changed since the sign-
ing of the last Geneva Convention almost 60 years ago.9 The
United States no longer engages states in large scale combat; no
longer are large armies, navies, and air forces clashing in bat-
tle.10 Instead, war is now being fought with extremist groups
who are not members of any state. 1 This is not how the draft-
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
5 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al Qaeda & Taliban Unlaw-
ful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of
Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
6 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2795.
9 See generally Donna Miles, QDR Provides Vectors for Defense Transforma-
tion, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14502; Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Director of
Force Transformation, Department of Defense, Speech to the Network Centric
Warfare 2003 Conference (Jan. 22, 2003), in TRANSFORMATION TRENDS, February
2003, available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library-files/trends_170Trans-
formation%20Trends-17%20February%201ssue.pdf.
10 See generally Miles, supra note 9; Cebrowski, supra note 9.
11 See generally id.
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ers of the Geneva Convention envisioned warfare; 12 they in-
stead thought of warfare as state versus state, such as what
occurred during World War II, which ended four years prior to
the signing of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 13
This casenote asserts that the Supreme Court in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld erroneously interpreted the Geneva Convention to
grant protection to members of al Qaeda and other terrorist or-
ganizations. In addition, this paper argues that the Geneva
Convention, as currently written, does not encompass the new
face of war - fighting between states and non-state interna-
tional organizations. As such, a new convention is necessary to
provide a minimal amount of protection to all people. Part II of
this casenote provides general background information about
the conflict with al Qaeda, the history of the Geneva Conven-
tions, and a brief history of the various generations of warfare.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, examining the majority decision, the concurrences,
and the dissents. Part IV discusses where the court erred in its
decisions and why al Qaeda prisoners do not qualify as prison-
ers of war. In addition, Part IV discusses how warfare has
changed since the 1949 Conventions and proposes changes to
the Conventions in order to expand protections to all
combatants.
II. BACKGROUND
The Conflict with al Qaeda
The conflict with al Qaeda has been ongoing for more than
a decade and spans many countries on multiple continents. 14 In
12 Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec'y, Statement by the Press Sec'y on the
Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html ("The war on terrorism is a war not envisaged
when the Geneva Convention was signed in 1949."). Id.
13 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Answers to Your
Questions].
14 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he
conflict with al Qaeda is international in character in the sense that it is occurring
in various nations around the globe. Thus, it is also 'occurring in the territory of
more than 'one of the High Contracting Parties.""); Brief for American Center for
Law and Justice & European Center for Law and Justice as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, (2006) (No. 05-184) (noting that attacks
from al Qaeda occur around the globe).
20071
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1993, al Qaeda detonated a bomb in the parking garage of the
World Trade Center Towers, causing the deaths of six people
and injuring thousands. 15 On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda again
attacked the United States, this time striking the embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. 16 In response, the United States retali-
ated against al Qaeda facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. 17 In
January 2000, al Qaeda attacked the USS Cole, a Navy de-
stroyer, while it was in port in Yemen, killing 17 and wounding
40.18 The most notable attacks against the United States are
those that occurred on September 11, 2001, striking the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon and killing 2,973 civilians.1 9
This brief thumbnail of al Qaeda actions against the United
States does not include their attacks on other countries, but
does show that their actions span the globe. 20
The Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions bind its signatories to grant cer-
tain protections to those involved in armed conflicts. 21 The
Conventions are not stagnant documents; instead, they are dy-
namic documents that have been modified as needed to encom-
pass the new face of war.22 The first Geneva Convention was
written in 1864 and signed by sixteen states. 23 The Swiss gov-
15 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT 69, 71 (2004).
16 Id. at 115-16.
17 Id. at 117.
18 Id. at 190.
19 Id. at 311.
20 See, e.g., United States Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, 217 (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf; Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, al-Qaeda (updated July 7, 2005), http://www.cfr.orgfpublication/9126/. The
Council on Foreign Relations listed a series of other attacks linked to al Qaeda:
the March 2004 bomb attacks on Madrid commuter trains, which killed nearly 200
people and left more than 1,800 injured; the May 2003 car bomb attacks on three
residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the November 2002 car bomb at-
tack and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli jetliner with shoulder-fired mis-
siles, both in Mombassa, Kenya; the October 2002 attack on a French tanker off
the coast of Yemen; several spring 2002 bombings in Pakistan; the April 2002 ex-
plosion of a fuel tanker outside a synagogue in Tunisia.
Id.
21 See Answers to Your Questions, supra note 13, at 12, 16.
22 Id. at 11.
23 Id. at 8.
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ernment, at the urging of Henry Dunant, Guillaume-Henri Du-
four, Gustave Moynier, Louis Appia, and Theodore Maunoir,24
first called for the Convention to provide for minimum protec-
tions for those engaged in armed conflicts. 25 The first Conven-
tion set forth a minimal standard for the treatment of wounded
armies in the battlefield and for the protection of medical per-
sonnel who were properly identified, along with other
protections.26
After the First World War, it was apparent that the Geneva
Convention needed to be modified in light of the advancements
in warfare that had occurred, such as the use of mustard gas,
along with other noxious gases.27 In 1925, the Geneva Protocol
was adopted prohibiting the use of such gases and bacteriologi-
cal weapons. 28 In 1929, the Second Geneva Convention was
created, adopting provisions regarding the "treatment of prison-
ers of war."29 The biggest change to the Geneva Convention oc-
curred in 1946, after World War II. Recognizing that warfare
had changed once again, and that it was necessary to revise the
Conventions to protect those involved in the conflict, a new set
of Geneva Conventions was created. 30 The 1949 Geneva Con-
vention, which remains in force today, created four conventions,
including the new fourth convention giving protection to civilian
persons in a time of war.31 Since 1949, the Geneva Conventions
24 Id. at 2. These men are the five founding members of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Id.
25 See id. at 8.
26 See Answers to Your Questions, supra note 13, at 8. The 1864 Convention
established:
standing written rules of universal scope to protect the victims of con-
flicts; its multilateral nature open to all States; the obligation to extend
care without discrimination to wounded and sick military personnel; re-
spect for and marking of medical personnel, transports and equipment
using an emblem (red cross on a white background).
27 See id. at 11.
28 See id. at 10.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 11. During World War II the ratio of civilians to military personnel
killed jumped from 1:10 in the First World War, to nearly a ratio of 1:1. Id.
31 Id. at 10. The Four Conventions are entitled: I) Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; II) Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea; III) Treatment of Prisoners of War; IV) Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War. They are known respectively as the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Con-
ventions. Id.
2007]
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have been supplemented three times (with the first two Addi-
tional Protocols in 1977 and the third in 2005) as shortcomings
in the original Conventions were found or the face of war
changed. 32 This brief history of the Geneva Conventions
reveals that throughout their existence these treaties have con-
stantly evolved in order to adapt to and encompass the new
ways that war is waged, and should continue to fulfill that role
in the future.
The Way War Has Been Fought
Military historians note that there have been four genera-
tions of modern warfare, beginning in 1648. The first genera-
tion of war - military culture and order - from 1648 to 1860,
brought the arrival of modern things such as uniforms, salut-
ing, and a system of ranks for the maintenance and enforce-
ment of this culture and order.33 The second generation evolved
from the French after the First World War, seeking the use of
mass fire, such as artillery fire, to cause as much damage to the
enemy as possible before sending in infantry troops.34 William
Lind argues that this is the type of warfare that the United
States still engages in, using air power instead of artillery to
bomb enemies into submission before sending in ground
troops.35 The third generation of warfare was developed by the
German army after the first World War, and is also known as
Blitzkrieg, and is based not on massive firepower and grinding
down the enemy, but instead is based on speed and surprise.36
In a third generation type war, the objective is to surround the
enemy, get behind him, and then collapse the enemy. 37 The
32 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8
June 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Adoption of Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III),
8 December 2005, 45 I.L.M. 558.
33 William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation War (Jan. 2004), http:l!
antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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fourth generation of warfare is characterized by "cultures, not
merely states, in conflict."38 It is in the fourth generation that
"the state loses its monopoly on war" and engages in conflicts
with non-state actors, such as al Qaeda.3 9
III. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
A. Facts of the Case
Towards the end of November 2001, Afghani militia forces
captured Salim Ahmed Hamdan. 40 Shortly after his capture
Hamdan was turned over to the United States military and was
then transported to the United States Naval Station in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.41 Upon arrival at Guantanamo Bay, Hamdan
was held with the general population, known as Camp Delta.42
On June 3, 2003, President George W. Bush determined that
Hamdan was either a member of al Qaeda or had aided in ter-
rorist activities against the United States, and he was desig-
nated for trial before a military commission.43 He was then
moved to solitary confinement in Camp Echo, away from the
general population, and was appointed counsel in December
2003.44 Counsel, however, was initially appointed solely for
plea negotiations. 45
B. Procedural History
In April 2004, Hamdan filed for a writ of habeas corpus
with the District of Columbia District Court, and the govern-
ment formally charged him with "conspiracy to commit attacks
on civilians and civilian objects, murder and destruction of
property by an unprivileged belligerent, and terrorism."46 In
addition, the government alleged that between 1996 and No-
38 Id.
39 William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation War (Jan. 2004), http://
antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
40 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This casenote cites
to the appellate decision and not the Supreme Court decision for the fact section
only because the D.C. Circuit has more detailed facts in its opinion.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
2007]
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vember 2001 Hamdan worked as Osama bin Laden's47 personal
driver, which Hamdan admitted to in an affidavit. 48 He also
admitted that he worked as bin Laden's bodyguard, that he
drove bin Laden to al Qaeda training camps, delivered weapons,
and trained at al Farouq camp, a training camp sponsored by al
Qaeda. 49 In addition, on July 7, 2004, a Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal affirmed Hamdan's status as an enemy combat-
ant.50  On November 8, 2004, the District Court granted
Hamdan's petition for habeas corpus.5 1 The District Court
halted the commission's proceeding.52 The District Court held
that the commission violated the Geneva Convention (III) Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and that Hamdan
was fully entitled to protections under the Convention.53 In ad-
dition, the District Court held that both the Third Geneva Con-
vention and the Uniform Code of Military Justice were violated
by the procedures of the military commissions. 54
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia disagreed
with the District Court and reversed the decision. 55 The Court
47 Osama bin Laden is the founder of the radical Islamic terrorist group al
Qaeda. He was born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia to a wealthy family, with ties to the
Saudi royal family. During his education in both school and university he was a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
Osama bin Laden traveled to Pakistan and met with rebel leaders resisting the
invasion. He then set out collecting money and supplies for the rebels and later
joined the fighting. He then opened a guesthouse and camps inside of Afghanistan
to support those resisting the Soviets' invasion, thus founding al Qaeda. Bin
Laden was a highly respected military commander. Once the Soviets were de-
feated bin Laden offered his army to defend Saudi Arabia in case Iraq expanded its
invasion from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia turned down his help and
allowed the United States to assist. Osama bin Laden felt extremely betrayed and
then turned his focus to attacking the United States and its allies in the Middle
East. He was then thrown out of Saudi Arabia, and eventually stripped of his
citizenship. In the mid-1990's he called for war against the United States and
Jews around the world. Who is Osama bin Laden?, Brit. Broad. Corp. (July 26,
2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/1551100.stm.
48 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 35.
49 Id.
50 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006). The CSRT is required
under the decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004).
51 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2762.
55 Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/1
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of Appeals agreed that the Third Geneva Convention was not
enforceable in the courts. Also, two of the judges agreed that
Hamdan, even if he could enforce the Third Geneva Convention
in court, was not entitled to protections of the Convention. 56
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on
November 7, 2005, to decide the question of "whether the mili-
tary commission convened to try Hamdan has the authority to
do so, and whether Hamdan may rely on the Geneva Conven-
tions in these proceedings. '57
C. Holding of the Court and its Reasoning
In a highly fragmented, majority decision, Justice Stevens
writing for the Court joined, in parts, by Justices Kennedy, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,58 held that military commissions vio-
lated the Geneva Conventions. 59 The Supreme Court disagreed
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that Article 2 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions 60 governs the conflict with al Qaeda
because, unlike Afghanistan, al Qaeda is not a party to the Con-
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2759. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through IV, Parts VI
through VI-D-iii, Part VI-D-v, and Part VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts V
and VI-D-iv, in which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsberg, Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice Breyer joined. Id.
59 Id. at 2793.
60 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 2].
Common Article 2 (referred to as "common" because it appears in all four Conven-
tions) states:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it
in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Con-
vention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.
9
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ventions, and thus it is not applicable to the conflict. 61 The
Court stated that it had no reason to decide if that argument
has merit, because it finds that Article 3 of the Conventions 62
does encompass the conflict with al Qaeda.63 The Court inter-
preted the phrase "conflict not of an international character" to
include any conflict not between nations, and noted that Com-
mon Article 3 only grants minimal protections to those individu-
als who are not members of any state but involved in a conflict
within the territory of a signatory.64 In addition, the Court
stated that the official commentaries of the Third Geneva Con-
vention note that the scope of the Article should be as broad as
possible and that language limiting the scope of the Article was
not included in the final version of Common Article 3.65
Since the court finds that Common Article 3 applies to this
conflict, Hamdan would be entitled to trial by a "'regularly con-
stituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."' 66 In addi-
61 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
62 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 31. The
applicable sections of Common Article 3 state:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the con-
flict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain pro-
hibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples.
Id.
63 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
64 Id. at 2796.
65 Id.
66 Id. (quoting 6 U.S.T. at 3320).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/1
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tion, the Court noted that commentary for the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that the term "regularly constituted" courts
includes military courts, but excludes special tribunals.67 Al-
though the term "regularly constituted" is not defined in the Ge-
neva Conventions, the Court states that it has been understood
to include the minimum protections of customary international
law, and did not encompass the military commissions at issue
here.68 Even though Common Article 3 is very broad in what it
permits, the commissions here are outside of its scope. 69
D. Concurrence of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion echoes the state-
ments of much of the Court's opinion in that the military com-
missions are not in accordance with Common Article 3.70
Justice Kennedy stated that these commissions are not per se
invalidated just because the President and not Congress cre-
ated them. 71 For these commissions to be valid, they must ad-
here to the minimal protections of the regular courts. 72 He
further stated that even though Hamdan is charged with "overt
acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit terrorism," there
is still "no exigency requiring special speed or precluding care-
ful consideration of evidence." 73 He also carefully points out a
distinct difference between the normal military courts and
these special commissions, namely that the 'judges' in the com-
missions were not the normal military judges and the Ap-
pointing Authority assigns them. 74 Justice Kennedy also noted
that the Appointing Authority has much more power over the
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2797.
69 Id. at 2798.
70 Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, in addition to joining
in part of the majority opinion also penned a brief concurrence, which has been
omitted from this casenote because it does not fall within its scope. Also, Justice
Breyer only joins Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parts I and II. Id.
71 Id. at 2804.
72 Id. at 2804.
73 Id. at 2804-05.
74 Id. at 2806.
20071
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commission than a Convening Authority does over a court
martial.75
E. The Dissents of Thomas and Alito
Justice Thomas dissented with the Court's opinion and is
joined by Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito in part. Thomas's
first contention is that he disagrees that the Supreme Court has
the jurisdiction to hear the claim, and that it is the Court's
"well-established duty to respect the Executive's judgment in
matters of military operation and foreign affairs." 76 He also
stated that in cases arising in similar circumstances the Court
has decided that it is within the President's ability to detain
and try prisoners, as an extension of his powers as Commander-
in-Chief in times of war, so long as it does not conflict with the
United States Constitution or validly enacted Congressional
laws. 77 In addition, Thomas stated that the Supreme Court has
already decided that it does not have jurisdiction over claims
arising out of the Geneva Convention in Johnson v. Eisentrager,
and that Eisentrager prohibits a person from evading prosecu-
tion from war crimes trials by using the Geneva Conventions. 78
Thomas' main argument against the Court's Geneva Con-
ventions holding is that the opinion as based on "Common Arti-
cle 3, [which] applies to 'armed conflicts not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties."' 79 Thomas states that the President, under
his authority as Commander-in-Chief, accepted the Department
of Justice's decisions that Common Article 3 does not apply to al
Qaeda members.80 In addition, the dissent states that the Su-
preme Court has determined that Common Article 3 requires
that the President make "a judgment about the nature and
character of the conflict."8' The dissent further states that the
75 Id. at 2807. Justice Kennedy notes that the Appointing Authority has su-
pervisory powers during the trial, decides any interlocutory appeals, and has
greater flexibility in appointing the members of the commission. Id.
76 Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2824 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)).
78 Id. at 2844 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950)).
79 Id. at 2846 (citing 6 U.S.T. at 3318).
80 Id. at 2846.
81 Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)).
[Vol. 19:143
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current conflict with al Qaeda is international in nature be-
cause it occurs in various states around the world, including
more than one High Contracting Party.8 2 In addition, the dis-
sent goes on to state that Common Article 3 was designed to
provide minimal protections for fighters involved in a civil
war.
8 3
The dissent also takes issue with the fact that the majority
claims that military commissions are not regularly constituted,
noting their 150-year history of use, from the Civil War on-
ward.8 4 In concluding, Thomas states that Common Article 285
of the Geneva Convention is intended to control conflicts that
are international in scope between two signatories.8 6 However
it is inapplicable to the current conflict with al Qaeda because
"al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party."8 7
Justice Alito wrote a separate dissent and was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas in part.88 Justice Alito notes that
Article 6689 of the Fourth Geneva Convention bans the "occupy-
82 Id. at 2846.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2847.
85 For the text of Common Article 2, see supra note 60.
86 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2849.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2849-55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
89 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 66, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states:
In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second
paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its
properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts
sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the occupied
country.
The Commentaries for this article state that:
The powers referred to may only be exercised on certain conditions, the observance
of which is imperative:
(a) The accused may only be brought before "military courts", that is
before courts whose members have military status and are subordinate to
the military authorities (1). These courts, dealing as they do with the of-
fences committed by the army of occupation, will normally sit in occupied
territory, and can therefore try cases involving other people in such terri-
tory. That is doubtless the reason why military courts have been pre-
scribed, since it will be seen that another of the conditions on which the
right to exercise jurisdiction depends, is that the court should sit within
the occupied territory.
(b) The military courts must be "non-political". This clause forbids certain
practices resorted to during the Second World War when the judicial ma-
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ing power from trying civilians in courts set up specially for that
purpose."90 In addition, Alito states that the term "special
tribunals" does not apply to the current tribunals in use be-
cause "special" implies a single event whereas regular means
standard in occurrence and practice.9 1
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Erroneously Qualified the Conflict with al
Qaeda as "Not International in Scope"
The United States Supreme Court erred when it classified
the current conflict with the terrorist organization al Qaeda 92
as not being international in character.93 The Court inaccu-
rately expands the Common Article 3 definition of "conflict not
of an international character"94 to apply to any conflict that is
not between two nations, which serves as contrast to Common
Article 2, 95 that provides the protections for conflicts that are
international in scope. 96 The Court states simply that Common
Article 397 serves as a catchall for all other conflicts that arise.98
chinery was sometimes used as an instrument of political or racial
persecution.
(c) The courts are to be "regularly constituted". This wording definitely
excludes all special tribunals. It is the ordinary military courts of the Oc-
cupying Power which will be competent. Such courts will, of course, be set
up in accordance with the recognized principles governing the administra-
tion of justice."
It will be seen later (Article 71 and following) that the proceedings in such courts
are governed by a set of extremely detailed provisions, providing protected persons
with every guarantee of respect for the human person.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Times of War, at 340-41, available at http://www.cicr.
org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600073?openDocument [hereinafter Convention IV
Commentary].
90 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2852 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting).
91 See id.
92 Al Qaeda is a global terrorist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in
1988. Its main goal is to defeat the United States and Israel and establish a pan-
Islamic caliphate. The group has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks
around the world, notably the attacks on September 11, 2001. United States Dep't
of State, supra note 20, at 217. For information on other al Qaeda attacks, see
supra note 20. For information on al Qaeda's leadership, see infra note 128.
93 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
94 Common Article 3, supra note 62, 1.
95 For the full text of Common Article 2, see supra note 60.
96 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
97 For the relevant text of Common Article 3, see supra note 62.
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This reading is erroneous and not supported by the Geneva
Convention Commentaries, as the dissenting opinion points
out. 9 9
Common Article 3 applies "in cases of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties."100 Compare Common Article 3
with the plain language of Common Article 2, which states that:
[t]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties .... Although one of the
Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention
.... They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in rela-
tion to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provi-
sions thereof.10 1
It is evident from the plain language of the two articles that
Common Article 2 applies in cases of international conflict, even
when one of the warring parties is not a signatory to the Con-
vention. 10 2 The Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis
of Common Article 3, looking for any minutia on which to hang
its argument, but if the Court had spent more time examining
Common Article 2, they would have seen that this situation is
contemplated and discussed in the commentaries accompanying
Common Article 2.103 The commentary of Common Article 2
discusses in depth the steps that a non-party to the Convention
must take in order to continue being protected under the con-
vention. 10 4 There are two conditions that must be fulfilled in
order for a non-signing party to be protected under the Conven-
tion, "acceptance and . . . de facto application of the Conven-
tion." 0 5 The commentary goes on to state that a declaration,
while highly recommended, is not required, so long as the party
98 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
99 See id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100 Common Article 3, supra note 62, 1 1.
101 Common Article 2, supra note 60.
102 See id.
103 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, at 24, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/
COM/375-590005?OpenDocument [hereinafter Convention III Commentary].
104 Id.
105 Id. at 25.
2007]
15
PACE INT'L L. REV.
adheres to the provisions of the Conventions.10 6 In addition,
the commentary states that the signatory to the Conventions is
obliged to adhere to them until the non-signatory's intent can be
determined.1 0 7
In the United States' current conflict with al Qaeda, it was
clear from the outset that al Qaeda did not intend to uphold the
Conventions. Notably, the first attack in this current conflict -
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the destruction of a
civilian target, the World Trade Center - was an affront to the
Conventions and other laws of war.' 0 8 The Fourth Geneva Con-
vention outlines what it terms "grave breaches" of the conven-
tion; these include "willful killing, torture, or inhumane
treatment ...of a protected person ...taking hostages and
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly."' 0 9 The terrorist actions of al Qaeda on September 11,
2001, can be considered grave breaches of the Conventions, as
are the ongoing kidnapping of soldiers and civilians in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, and as such the United States as signatory has
no legal duty to uphold the Conventions. 110 Despite this there
still may remain a humanitarian reason to uphold the Conven-
tion but, "as a concession to legal form . . . a High Contracting
Party may be legally released from its obligations.""' Thus, the
United States has no legal duty to enforce the provisions of
Common Article 2 to members of al Qaeda.
The Supreme Court, possibly realizing that under Common
Article 2 the United States did not have to maintain its obliga-
tions under the Conventions, chose to apply Common Article 3
instead. This is a noble aim of the Court in an attempt to find a
legal way for the United States to maintain its ethical obliga-
tions under the Conventions, but the Conventions as written do
not justify such a reading. Common Article 3 sets forth provi-
106 Id. at 26.
107 Id.
108 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 89, art. 147; see also Yamashita
v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946) (stating that the destruction of property and killing
of unarmed, noncombatant civilians without cause are violations of the laws of
war).
109 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 89, art. 147.
110 See Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 26.
111 Id.
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sions that are to be upheld in cases of armed conflict that are
not of an international scope.112 And when the plain language
of Common Article 2 and Common Article 3 are compared it is
clear that Common Article 3 does not apply in conflicts that oc-
cur in more than one state.1 3
In addition to the plain language of Common Article 3, the
commentaries accompanying Common Article 3 give a better
understanding of what is encompassed by it. The commentaries
note, after a discussion of the history of Common Article 3:
It applies to non-international conflicts only . . . It at least
ensures the application of the rules of humanity which are recog-
nized as essential by civilized nations and provides a legal basis
for interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross
or any other impartial humanitarian organization-interventions
which in the past were all too often refused on the ground that
they represented intolerable interference in the internal affairs of
a State.1 14
The commentary goes on to give some of the language of the
previously proposed versions of the article in order to provide a
reference point, although it does say there is no criteria for de-
termining whether or not a group is entitled to the protections
under Common Article 3.1"5 Some of these criteria include that
the revolting party has an organized military force, an author-
ity responsible for the acts, or that the de jure government"16
has recognized the insurgents. The commentary also notes that
if the dispute has been submitted to the United Nations or if the
insurgents have de facto authority over part of the population
and a substantial part of the national territory, then they would
fall under the scope of Common Article 3.117 As is noted in the
112 Common Article 3, supra note 62.
113 Compare Common Article 2, supra note 60, with Common Article 3, supra
note 62, 1.
114 Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 34-35 (emphasis added).
115 Id.
116 A "de jure government" is defined as "[a] functioning government that is
legally established. - Also termed government dejure." In comparison, a "de facto
government" is defined as "1. A government that has taken over the regular gov-
ernment and exercises sovereignty over a nation. 2. An independent government
established and exercised by a group of a country's inhabitants who have sepa-
rated themselves from the parent state. - Also termed government de facto."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (8th ed. 2004).
117 Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 36.
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commentary and by the Court in Hamdan, the application of
Common Article 3 must be as wide as possible.' 18 However, a
further reading of the paragraph in which the admonition that
the scope of Common Article 3 needs to be as wide as possible is
necessary to frame its context. The commentary goes on to
state that Common Article 3 should be applied in cases where
conflict breaks out in a country but does not meet any of the
previously mentioned criteria ("even in cases of civil distur-
bance which could justly be described as mere acts of bandi-
try."). 119 The conclusion of this paragraph states that the
conflicts covered by Common Article 3 are "armed conflicts...
which are in many respects similar to an international war, but
take place within the confines of a single country."120
The conflict with al Qaeda is certainly an international con-
flict, not being contained within one nation's borders, but in-
stead spanning the globe. As such, the Supreme Court erred
when it decided in Hamdan that Common Article 3 applied to
the current conflict with al Qaeda. The Geneva Conventions
Common Article 2 should be the controlling article, since it per-
tains to international conflicts, 12 1 but in its current state the
Geneva Conventions do not cover members of al Qaeda since, as
a non-signatory to the Conventions, they have shown clear in-
tent to not follow them. As such the United States is no longer
bound to follow them in regard to al Qaeda.
B. Detainees who are members of al Qaeda do not qualify as
prisoners of war
Under the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, members of al Qaeda would not qual-
ify for protection as prisoners of war.122 Article 4 lays out strict
qualifications for "prisoner of war" status, specifically for mili-
tias or volunteer resistance groups, and mandates that they
meet the following criteria:
that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
118 Id.; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006).
119 Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 36.
120 Id. at 37.
121 See Common Article 2, supra note 60.
122 See In re Guantanamo Detainees, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
that of carrying arms openly;
that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.12 3
Members of al Qaeda do not meet all of these conditions and
as such are not entitled to protection under the Conventions.
12 4
Al Qaeda might meet the first criteria under Article 4, hav-
ing a commander responsible for subordinates' actions. The
commentaries do not speak much to the first provision,
but Lieutenant Colonel Bialke states that in order for the
first criteria to be met a "force must have an operative, struc-
tured hierarchical system of military good order and dis-
cipline acting under an authority that expressly subjects
itself to international law." 125 Al Qaeda does, or did have,
some chain of command led by Osama bin Laden and
formerly by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.126 But in order to qualify
123 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Convention]. The
relevant text of Article 4 of the Third Convention reads:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as mem-
bers of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, in-
cluding those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, in-
cluding such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
124 See Brief for Former Attorneys General of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184)
(noting that al Qaeda does not qualify as a group under Article 4, and to hold them
as such a group would undermine the entire Convention); see also Bialke, supra
note 5, at 1.
125 Bialke, supra note 5, at 23.
126 See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 20; United States Dep't of
State, supra note 20, at 219. A description of the al Qaeda chain of command: Ac-
cording to a 1998 federal indictment, al-Qaeda is administered by a council that
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under Article 4 a group must meet all four qualifica-
tions.127
Al Qaeda does not meet the second qualification of a group
under Article 4, that of wearing a distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance.128 To meet this requirement, the commentary on
the Third Geneva Convention states: "the sign must be the
same for all the members of any one resistance organization,
and must be used only by that organization."129 Examples of
types of signs include armbands, caps (which may not be fully
adequate because they are frequently removed), a coat, shirt, or
a symbol worn over the chest. 130 The symbol must also be af-
fixed to any vehicle that is carrying members of the group.' 31
This requirement is designed to ensure the protection of civil-
ians by not permitting combatants to hide their status.1 32 Al
Qaeda does not distinguish itself from the civilian population,
nor do they wear a distinctive symbol that would be recogniza-
ble, and as such, they fail to meet this vital criteria to qualify as
a prisoner of war.' 33
"discussed and approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations." At
the top is bin Laden. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, is
thought to be bin Laden's top lieutenant and al-Qaeda's ideological adviser. The
Jordanian radical Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who directed a series of deadly terror
attacks in Iraq - including the beheadings of kidnapped foreigners - was also asso-
ciated with al-Qaeda. Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004,
and bin Laden praised Zarqawi as "the prince of al Qaeda in Iraq." Zarquwi was
killed in a U.S.-led bombing raid in Baghdad in June 2006. At least one senior al-
Qaeda commander, Muhammad Atef, died in the U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan,
and another top lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah, was captured in Pakistan in March
2002. In March 2003, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, and al-Qaeda's treasurer, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, were
also captured in Pakistan. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 20; United
States Dep't of State, supra note 20, at 219.
127 Third Convention, supra note 123, art. 4, § 2.
128 Id. § 2(b).
129 Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 60.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Bialke, supra note 5, at 25.
133 Id. at 32-33 (stating that the Taliban and al Qaeda had worked together
and in fact the Taliban military force was made up in a large proportion of al
Qaeda fighters, and that there was no uniform or distinctive symbol worn by either
party); see also Fleischer, supra note 12 (noting that the Taliban and al Qaeda
have failed to distinguish themselves from civilian populations).
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The third qualification, "that of carrying arms openly," 134 is
also not met by al Qaeda members. The commentary also states
that carrying arms openly does not mean that weapons cannot
be hidden from view. 135 Rather, the combatants must be able to
recognize each other as such, and a combatant should not be
able to disguise himself as a civilian, take unfair advantage of
this status, and open fire.136 Al Qaeda's failure to do this can be
noted throughout its history of attacks, and failure to adhere to
the second requirement of Article 4 by disguising themselves as
civilians. It has been noted earlier in this paper that al Qaeda
has failed to adhere to the laws and customs of war in con-
ducting its operations. 137 As such, al Qaeda fails to meet the
criteria of the final section of Article 4.
Therefore, Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention fails to
cover members of al Qaeda. In addition, Common Articles 2
and 3, despite what the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan, also
do not protect members of al Qaeda or other such organizations.
Because of this lack of protection within the Conventions, an
update must be made in order to provide a minimal level of pro-
tection to all people, regardless of their affiliation or conduct.
An update would not condone these activities; instead, it would
show a resolve to maintain our system of justice for all, and
would give all people a bare minimal protection. It is not being
argued that terrorist groups should have full protection of pris-
oner of war status, but some of the protections put forth in Com-
mon Article 3 should apply to people engaged in an
international conflict not occurring between signatories to the
Conventions. The Conventions were intended to give protec-
tions to those engaged in combat, regardless of their legal sta-
tus. The proposals put forth in this casenote are intended to
expand minimal protections to all people, as is within the spirit
of the Conventions.138
134 Third Convention, supra note 123, art. 4, § 2(c).
135 Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 61.
136 Id.
137 Third Convention, supra note 123, art. 4, § 2(d).
138 See, e.g., Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 36 (noting that
Common Article 3 should have a broad interpretation); id. at 26 (stating that as a
concession to legal form a party may be released from its obligations under Com-
mon Article 2, but that a party should not forsake its duty).
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C. Warfare has evolved from state vs. state to state vs. non-
state actor
As stated in the introduction to this piece, the United
States is no longer engaging in large-scale warfare, engaging
other states in state versus state conflict. 139 This is a drastic
change from the time when the Geneva Conventions were last
updated en mass in 1949.140 Military scholars are noting that
conflicts are evolving into what has been called Fourth Genera-
tion Warfare. 141
Fourth Generation War is not necessarily new. William S.
Lind, the Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism and
the Free Congress Foundation, notes it can be traced back to
the mid 1600s. 142 He notes that Fourth Generation War is
"marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states in
conflict."1 43 In a Fourth Generation Type conflict, it is hard to
separate the leaders from the troops, both in physical location
and in their mentality. 144 In addition, Fourth Generation War-
fare is marked by the use of standard guerrilla 145 tactics.146
This is not to say that all wars fought are not state versus
state, but instead to say that merely state versus non-state ac-
tor is growing and has substantially changed the way the
United States is fighting wars. 147 It has been noted though,
139 See Miles, supra note 9; see also Cebrowski, supra note 9.
140 See Cebrowski, supra note 9.
141 See Lind, supra note 33; see also Michael J. Mazarr, Extremism, Terror, and
the Future of Conflict (2006), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/489
7841.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); see also Victor Davis Hanson, Address at the
University of Oregon: War and the West, Then and Now (Feb. 11, 2004), available
at http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson072005.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2008).
142 Lind, supra note 33.
143 Id.
144 Id. ("Osama bin Laden, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave.
Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example."). Id.
145 Guerrilla is defined as:
Hostilities that are conducted by individuals or small groups who are usu-
ally not part of an organized army and who fight by means of surprise
attacks, ambushes, and sabotage. Formerly, it was thought that the hos-
tilities had to be conducted in enemy-occupied territory. Typically, guer-
rilla warfare is carried out only when geographical conditions are
favorable and when the civilian population is at least partly cooperative.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (8th ed. 2004).
146 Lind, supra note 33.
147 Mazzar, supra note 141.
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that this type of warfare is on the rise, that the major conflicts
currently involve the United States, and that other states are in
conflicts against non-state actors. 148 War is being fought in a
different way, in a way not envisioned by the drafters of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. Therefore, they do not provide pro-
tections to those fighting in this new state of warfare, and they
should be expanded to include some minimal protections for
those involved in the conflict.
Proposed Changes to the Geneva Conventions
In order to provide a minimal level of protection for all peo-
ple engaged in conflict, certain elements should be adopted into
the Geneva Conventions. I propose amending Common Article
3 to extend provisions to all those engaged in combat against
one or more signatories. As such, the first sentence of Common
Article 3 should be changed to "in the case of armed conflicts
between one or more signatories and a non-signing party, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions ... ." In addition to the provisions already
established by Common Article 3, a section (1)(e) should be ad-
ded that would require that all combatants captured must go
before a status review tribunal, such as those mandated by the
United States Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in order to
determine if they are entitled to further protections. 149 Also, a
section (3) should be added which would state that any signa-
tory is bound to uphold these minimal protections regardless of
whether the other party to the conflict is a signatory or is up-
holding the convention. Finally, this new version of Common
Article 3 would include in the concluding paragraph that mem-
bers of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent shall not
offer their services to illegal actors engaged in combat, such as
al Qaeda, but shall be allowed to give aid to those captured by
other forces. This final addition shall not apply to groups in re-
bellion or in cases of civil war.
148 See Miles, supra note 9; Cebrowski, supra note 9; Lind, supra note 33; Maz-
zar, supra note 141; Hanson, supra note 141.
149 It would be here that the determination would be made if a captured person
was entitled to Prisoner of War Status or whether they were to be classified as an
enemy combatant. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2761.
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These additions are derived from the idea that the Conven-
tions should provide a minimum level of protection for all peo-
ple, and they are intended to remedy the current situation in
which a country may opt out of giving minimal protections to
certain groups because they fail to conform to certain criteria.
It is evident from the Commentaries that the drafters intended
for the Conventions to protect as many people and be as broad
as possible. 150 However, the current type of conflict was one
which was not foreseen when the Conventions were written in
1949.151 These additions will ensure the minimal protections of
people captured in modern combat, giving people who may be
illegal combatants, such as al Qaeda members, the opportunity
to challenge their status as illegal combatants. These additions
will ensure that all signatories to the Conventions will uphold a
minimal level of protection in all conflicts. The change prohibit-
ing ICRC personnel from giving aid to illegal groups is justified
because groups that are not willing to uphold these minimal
provisions of the Conventions, such as al Qaeda, should not be
given full protections. This withholding of ICRC aid may help
persuade groups to follow the conventions in order to receive
the appropriate aid.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in what appears to be an attempt to
grant protections to those who are not legally entitled to them,
extended protections under the Geneva Conventions to mem-
bers of al Qaeda in its decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The
Court erroneously applied Common Article 3, which applies to
conflicts not international in scope; more specifically, Common
Article 3 is intended to be used in cases of civil war, rebellion,
and the like, not in conflicts against an international terrorist
group. The dissent in Hamdan correctly states that the Com-
mon Article 2 should be the controlling article in the conflict
with al Qaeda, and under Common Article 2, al Qaeda does not
150 See, e.g., Convention III Commentary, supra note 103, at 36 (noting that
Common Article 3 should have a broad interpretation); id. at 26 (stating that as a
concession to legal form a party may be released from its obligations under Com-
mon Article 2, but that a party should not forsake its duty).
151 See Fleischer, supra note 12 (noting that the current type of conflict was not
one envisioned by the drafters in 1949).
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qualify for protections, and the United States has no legal obli-
gations under the Geneva Conventions. In addition, al Qaeda
members are not entitled to protection under Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War.
In addition, the way war is being fought has changed dras-
tically since 1949; no longer is it state versus state, but instead
it is now state versus non-state actor. Because of this drastic
change in the way war is fought, and the fact that the current
Geneva Conventions are anemic with regards to the protection
of non-state actors in international conflict, it is time to once
again update the Geneva Conventions, to provide minimal pro-
tections for these people, despite their status as illegal
combatants.
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